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Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality! 
J. Peter Byrne∗ 
The plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection articulated a new doctrine of 
“judicial takings” and purported to justify it with arguments drawing on text, 
history, precedent, and “common sense.” This Article argues that the opinion 
makes a mockery of such forms of interpretation, represents raw pursuit of an 
ideological agenda, and indicates why the regulatory takings doctrine, more 
generally, should be abandoned or limited. 
 
* * * 
 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, a four-justice plurality embraced a new doctrine of 
judicial takings that would constitutionally prohibit a state court from changing 
its own common law so as to eliminate “an established right of private 
property” without paying compensation.1 The plurality opinion, authored by 
Justice Scalia, seems to exemplify many of the vices of the conservative wing’s 
regulatory takings activism: ideological purpose, disregard of precedent and 
history, hypocrisy about federalism, veneration of a mythical common law of 
private property, and inveterate hostility to property law reforms to address 
environmental concerns, which would reduce the scope of owner discretion.2 
This Article highlights the central failings in the Stop the Beach plurality’s 
analysis and argues that those failings illustrate why the entire regulatory 
takings doctrine should be curtailed or abandoned. 
In 1961, Florida enacted its Beach and Shore Preservation Act, providing 
a legal mechanism for the state to restore eroded beaches at public expense 
Copyright © 2011 Regents of the University of California. 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Grateful thanks for research assistance 
go to Allison Gillis, J.D. Candidate, Georgetown Law, 2012. 
 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010). 
 2. See also Geoffrey Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional 
Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008) (“The current majority of the Supreme Court . . . are failing not 
only to preserve and protect fundamental constitutional values but also to fulfill their judicial 
responsibilities in a manner that is analytically rigorous, closely reasoned, and intellectually candid.”). 
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upon the request of local governments.3 Restoration involves pouring dry sand 
on the publicly-owned seabed, moving the tide line seaward. Not surprisingly, 
the statute provides that the public owns the newly-constructed portions of the 
beach. The statute replaces the traditional moveable boundary line of the mean 
high tide line between the private upland owner and the seaward public trust 
ownership with a fixed boundary based on the historic mean high tide line. The 
upland owner also receives several statutory protections, such as a guarantee of 
access to the water, a prohibition on the construction of structures on the newly 
built beach, and a reversion to the prior movable boundary should the state fail 
to maintain the widened sand beach.4 
In Stop the Beach, several upland littoral property owners challenged the 
legality of a beach restoration project in their area, arguing among other things 
that the restoration deprived them of the right to future accretions and the right 
to have their property boundary line touch the water, thereby violating the 
Florida Takings Clause. In rejecting the takings claim, the Florida Supreme 
Court held that the property owners never had such rights under the common 
law of the state.5 The owners then sought certiorari, claiming that the Florida 
court’s ruling changed the common law, effecting a judicial taking of their 
common law rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. Although the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, no justice 
who participated found any constitutional infirmity in the Florida Supreme 
Court’s ruling.6 Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinion found no violation, but the 
four most predictably conservative Justices on property rights issues formed a 
plurality in support of Parts II and III of the opinion, which embraced an 
aggressive concept of judicial takings as an apparent beachhead for future 
activist expansion of constitutional property rights: the plurality claimed that 
any judicial decision that eliminated an “established” property right constituted 
a taking. “If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established 
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than 
if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by 
ation.”7 
The plurality opinion presented itself as determined to forge new 
constitutional doctrine, despite precedential, logical, and policy complexities. 
Relatively little attempt was made to justify the new rule normatively or 
jurisprudentially; all was urgent prescription linked to some sort of faux 
 3. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246 (codified as amended at FLA. 
STAT. §§ 161.011–.45 (2007)). 
 4. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.191–.201 (2007). 
 5. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1119 (Fla. 2008). 
 6. Justice Stevens did not participate, an important absence given his leadership of the effort to 
cabin constitutional property rights. 
 7. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010). 
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Clause8 limits judicial property decisions because the clause is phrased in the 
passive voice, thus implicitly applying to every branch of state government: 
The Takings Clause (unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto Clauses, see 
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1) is not addressed to the action of a specific 
branch or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not with the 
governmental actor (“nor shall private property be taken” (emphasis 
added)). There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the 
scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property without just 
compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the 
expropriation. 9 
While some jurists take the view that the text of the Constitution is the best 
indication of its meaning, the plurality’s literalism lays excessive stress on the 
Fifth Amendment’s compact grammar. Textualism as a method of 
interpretation can be justified only as a means to capture the original public 
meaning of the constitution.10 But the Takings Clause by its terms—and in 
judicial interpretations for its first 135 years—applied only to eminent domain, 
a specific power essentially legislative in character.11 Even the Supreme 
Court’s “originalist” justices have held that their expansive interpretation of the 
clause cannot find support in the original meaning of the Takings Clause. 
“Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it 
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct 
appropriation’ of property, or the functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of 
[the owner’s] possession.’”12 Since the Takings Clause originally did not apply 
to legislative changes in property rules, its passive voice cannot logically be 
construed to extend its original application to judicial changes. 
The plurality implicitly admitted the pointlessness of its textual argument 
by granting the premise of the criticism in Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion—that no one, when the Takings Clause was adopted, entertained any 
 8. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The Supreme Court first applied the Takings Clause to the states, as incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 9. 130 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 10. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–38 (1997); RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 92–93 (2004). Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz has 
employed a more literal method of textual reading that makes little claim to gleaning the original public 
meaning but has yet to offer a theoretical justification. See Nicholas Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the 
Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Meaning of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). Justice Kennedy rejected reliance on the Takings 
Clause for troubling judicial changes in property rules because, “as a matter of custom and practice, 
these are matters for the political branches—the legislature and the executive—not the courts.” Stop the 
Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2614. A stronger claim can be made: conceptually, eminent domain has long been 
considered an inherently legislative power, although one which the legislature can delegate to the 
executive. See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 
553, 568–69 (1972). 
 12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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idea that it applied to the common law decisions of state judges.13 In response, 
the plurality makes two thoroughly unpersuasive arguments. First, it argues that 
the text of the Takings Clause is so clear that any question of intent or 
contemporary meaning is irrelevant.14 This is textualism ad absurdum. The text 
of the Takings Clause does not state that it applies to judicial decisions. It 
would be clear if it did, but it does not. Rather, it fails to identify to whom its 
command applies, which should prompt the conscientious interpreter to look 
outside its bare words. A judge cannot plausibly rely on such a textual silence 
to hold that the clause applies to every branch of government, especially when 
other traditional and widely accepted methods of interpretation plainly establish 
that no one intended or understood such a meaning.15 These are word games, 
not legal interpretations. Moreover, given that the Court has construed the key 
and clear word “take” metaphorically to create a flexible check against legal 
change,16 the plurality seems to use severe literalism opportunistically to reach 
a conclusion desired for ideological reasons. 
The plurality’s second interpretative argument is even weaker. The 
plurality argued that the Framers did not worry about judicial takings because 
“the Constitution was adopted in an era when the courts had no power to 
‘change’ the common law.”17 This is nonsense as a matter of legal history. 
English common law underwent dramatic modernization in the eighteenth 
century,18 and American courts after independence immediately adapted 
English common law to suit American circumstances.19 Property law, too, had 
 13. 130 S. Ct. at 2606 (“We do not grasp the relevance of Justice Kennedy’s speculation . . . that 
the Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to judicial action. They doubtless did not, 
since the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”). 
 14. Id. at 2606 (“Where the text they adopted is clear, however (‘nor shall private property be 
taken for public use’), what counts is not what they envisioned but what they wrote.”). 
 15. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (“It is at best treacherous to find in 
Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.”). In applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to whether a statute is sufficiently 
clear to invalidate an agency’s contrary interpretation, the Court has repeatedly found that silence or 
other failure to address “the precise question” at issue defeats clarity. See Mayo Found. v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (stating that the regulatory takings 
doctrine “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in 
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain”). It is 
instructive to recall that Justice O’Connor’s emphasis in Lingle on regulations that are functionally 
equivalent to expropriation rejected yet broader extensions of the doctrine. Id. at 543 (rejecting claim 
that regualtions that fail to substantially advance a governmental interest can effect a taking). 
 17. 130 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 18. See, e.g., JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 13–14 (2004) 
(“Lord Mansfield was sworn in as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s bench on Monday, 8 November 
1756. . . . Once on King’s Bench, Mansfield wasted no time in initiating change. The first steps were 
procedural, but his strong substantive imprimatur—especially on commercial themes—was soon to 
follow, and it was pervasive.”). 
 19. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 69 (3d ed. 2005) (1973) 
(“The country invited in only those English doctrines that were needed and wanted. Between 1776 and 
the middle of the nineteenth century, there were sweeping changes in American law.”). 
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undergone constant change;20 one need only recall the development of the 
common law rule against perpetuities, which sharply reduced the ability of 
owners to settle family property for indefinite periods.21 Indeed, the modern 
idea of stare decisis did not even evolve until the middle of the nineteenth 
century.22 In any event, given that the issue primarily involves federal court 
review of a state court decision interpreting state law, surely the correct 
historical reference point here is the year 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, by when, the plurality admits, state courts 
undoubtedly  changed the common law.23 
Plainly, the plurality’s textual argument is so much lipstick on a pig. The 
essence of the plurality’s judgment is contained in its brief nugget of “common 
sense”: “It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the 
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”24 This statement merely 
provides a conclusion to the central question in the case without offering any 
analysis. The key and only citation here is to Justice Scalia’s 1994 dissent from 
the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. Cannon Beach, which has no precedential 
value.25 Stevens implemented the Oregon Supreme Court’s controversial 
holding under a novel reading of the doctrine of custom that the dry sand 
beaches of Oregon are open to the public.26 Whether such a large and sudden 
change in the common law raises constitutional problems is a valid question. 
Professor Thompson’s classic article, Judicial Takings, focused on Oregon and 
similar decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, which greatly expanded public rights 
 20. See, e.g., RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 2.06 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed. 
2007) (“At any stage in human history the prevailing institution of property is chiefly an inheritance 
from the past. This inheritance, however, is subject to constant change. These changes represent efforts 
to work out adaptations to the new problems presented by new ingredients in the political, economic, 
and philosophical atmosphere of the moment. The fact of change is an ever-present phenomenon in 
society.”). 
 21. Id. at § 19.06[3]. 
 22. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 199 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 23. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (“In our opinion, a 
judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the 
state or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon 
principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the 
constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the state is 
a denial by that state of a right secured to the owner by that instrument.”). See Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and Regulatory Takings  Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory 
Takings, But the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 731 (2008) (“While the 
federal government is restricted by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the states are restricted 
by the Takings Clause as it is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it is regularly, if 
not uniformly, assumed that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause has the same original meaning as the 
incorporated Fourteenth Amendment Takings Clause, that may not be true. These enactments were 
passed at different times, under different circumstances, and with different purposes.”). 
 24. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010). 
 25. Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211–12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
 26. Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
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to beaches.27 His nuanced and painstaking analysis considered numerous 
issues, including comparative institutional competencies and pressures, before 
concluding in favor of a limited form of judicial takings doctrine.28 
The Stop the Beach plurality undertakes no such consideration of the 
similarities and differences between legislatures and courts.29 But the rhetoric 
of their “common sense” nugget strongly implies an equivalence between the 
function and practice of courts and legislatures. Courts issue “decrees,” and 
legislatures issue “fiats.” One must be struck not only by the normative 
equivalence of these descriptions, but also by how they denigrate both 
institutions being compared. The plurality acknowledges nothing about the 
constraints of law, reason, or tenure on judicial decision making, nor of 
democratic voice and deliberation on that of legislatures.30 More sadly, the 
entire course of the plurality opinion bears out their disbelief in the efficacy of 
judicial reasoning because the opinion itself proceeds as an exercise of will 
rather than as a reasoned decision honoring its own institutional constraints. 
The plurality’s treatment of its precedents is fundamentally dishonest. It 
stated, “Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings 
effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact 
suggest the contrary.”31 While the peculiarly tendentious phasing may save this 
statement from being flatly wrong, it is still seriously misleading. In Stop the 
Beach, as in many earlier cases, the state court construed its precedents to hold 
that the plaintiff did not have the property right it claimed. The U.S. Supreme 
Court then reexamined Florida precedent to determine whether the Florida 
Supreme Court’s ruling was correct as a matter of Florida law, without any 
apparent deference to the state court’s decision. But the U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly rejected such an intrusive review of state court decisions about 
state law in opinions by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo, perhaps the 
three justices of the twentieth century best versed in the common law. Brandeis 
wrote: 
The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform 
with changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts administering 
the common law. Since it is for the state courts to interpret and declare the 
law of the State, it is for them to correct their errors and declare what the 
law has been as well as what it is. State courts, like this Court, may 
 27. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1507 (1990). 
 28. Id. at 1542–44. 
 29. Although Professor Thompson concluded that some federal constitutional limits on state court 
decisions were appropriate, the plurality never mentions his article, perhaps because he cautions restraint 
in the exercise of such federal review. 
 30. The classical tradition of constitutional interpretation begins with the distinction between 
judicial judgment and popular will, between law and politics, so it is startling to find justices so blithely 
denying its validity. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010). 
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ordinarily overrule their own decisions without offending constitutional 
guaranties, even though parties may have acted to their prejudice on the 
faith of the earlier decisions.32 
Some ignored precedents address facts difficult to distinguish from those 
in Stop the Beach. In Sauer v. City of New York,33 a property owner claimed 
that the state court’s decision took his property right in an easement of light, 
which he claimed had been clearly established in the court’s prior decisions. 
The Supreme Court, following an earlier dissent by Justice Holmes, 
categorically rejected this claim: 
Surely such questions [of state law] must be for the final determination of 
the state court. . . . Upon the ground, then, that under the law of New York, 
as determined by its highest court, the plaintiff never owned the easements 
which he claimed, and that therefore there was no property taken, we hold 
that no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is shown.34 
Holmes had argued in the prior case that a state court’s authority to craft a 
common law property rule necessarily included the right to change that rule.35 
He wrote: “I know of no constitutional principle to prevent the complete 
reversal of [the earlier precedent] tomorrow if it should seem proper to” the 
New York court.36 Moreover, because the New York court in that case, like the 
Florida court in Stop the Beach, had distinguished its precedent rather than 
overruled it, he continued: “[I]f we are bound by local decisions as to local 
rights in real estate then we are equally bound by the distinctions and the 
limitations of those rights declared by the local courts.”37 In later cases, the 
Court suggested that state court interpretations of their own property doctrines 
might violate due process if they lacked a “fair and substantial basis” in 
precedent,38 but never has a state court decision been found to violate that 
lenient standard. While the variety of factual settings of these cases do not yield 
a per se rule, these plainly relevant precedents strongly counsel against just the 
type of foray into state property law that the plurality would mandate. 
The earlier opinion closest to that of the Stop the Beach plurality is Justice 
Stewart’s 1967 concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, where the state 
court had held that beachfront accretions belong to the state, thereby overruling 
a twenty-year-old precedent.39 Stewart’s opinion, however, rests on a premise 
quite alien to the Stop the Beach plurality: 
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of real 
property is, under our constitution, left to the individual States to develop 
 32. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930); see also Great N. 
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364–65 (1932). 
 33. Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 542 (1907). 
 34. Id. at 548. 
 35. Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 572–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 574. 
 37. Id. at 576. 
 38. See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944). 
 39. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). 
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and administer. And surely Washington or any other State is free to make 
changes, either legislative or judicial, in its general rules of real property 
law, including the rules governing the property rights of riparian owners.40 
He went on, nonetheless, to write: 
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington . . . 
arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of course accept it 
as conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state 
law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference 
would be appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the 
constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of 
law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has 
taken never existed at all.41 
What Stewart’s position shared with the earlier approach of the Court, as the 
Brandeis quote demonstrates, is an understanding that the common law changes 
and that the U.S. Constitution does not commit the states to a regime of static 
property rights. Stewart was concerned about upsetting reasonable 
expectations, the core of the regulatory takings regime later established in the 
Penn Central case, a decision he joined.42 He framed the issue in terms of due 
process limitations on retroactivity, a lenient standard concerned with 
unfairness in each case. 
The plurality decision in Stop the Beach ignores these precedents. The 
plurality makes no mention at all of the opinions of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, 
or Cardozo. Stewart’s suggestion is dismissed like that of a novice student: 
“[T]he predictability test covers too little, because a judicial elimination of 
established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or even by 
holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking.”43 The plurality thus 
categorically rejected any notion that common law property rules properly 
change to meet “changing ideas and conditions,” without acknowledging that 
this has been the dominant understanding of property law for more than one 
hundred years.44 No jurisprudential or normative justification was offered, just 
 40. Id. at 295. 
 41. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967). 
 42. The view that the regulatory takings doctrine addresses harms inflicted on a property owner 
from unanticipated changes in property regulations originates in Frank Michelman’s enduring Property, 
Utility, and Fairness  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165 (1967), and was adopted in Penn Central Transportation Co,. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978). 
 43. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2610 
(2010). 
 44. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921) (“The 
work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures. 
What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the foundation on which new structures will 
be built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years. Little by little the old 
doctrine is undermined. Often encroachments are so gradual that their significance is at first obscured. 
Finally we discover that the contour of the landscape has been changed, that old maps must be cast 
aside, and the ground charted anew.”); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of 
Nature Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 
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a silly hypothetical based on the absurd premise that an American court would 
hold that no one can own more than one hundred acres of real estate.45 The 
plurality seems to think that an entirely static system of property rights is 
essential for individual liberty and that this is mandated by the Takings Clause, 
but it fails to seriously address the implausibility and radicalism of this view.46 
The plurality thus embraces a per se rule that judicial elimination of an 
“established property right” constitutes a judicial taking. In rejecting Justice 
Kennedy’s more limited check on state common law property changes under 
the Due Process Clause,47 the plurality praises the clarity of the rule it adopts 
as limiting its own discretion in individual cases. “The great attraction of 
Substantive Due Process as a substitute for more specific constitutional 
guarantees is that it never means never—because it never means anything 
precise.”48 This restates Justice Scalia’s oft-expressed preference for clear 
rules, but it still seems to be a perverse notion of judicial restraint that an 
aggressive per se rule that displaces traditional state authority wholesale should 
be preferred to a flexible standard cautiously employed.49 
Moreover, per se rules notoriously can contain conceptual conundrums. 
The plurality’s approach contains significant ambiguities that would bedevil 
future application of its rule. These may be best considered in the context of an 
extended example. Recently, in Proctor v. Huntington, the Washington 
Supreme Court arguably departed from precedent by holding that a defendant 
who erroneously and innocently built a house on his neighbor’s adjacent land 
(“Historically, property definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social 
structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners.”). 
 45. “If, for example, a state court held in one case, to which the complaining property owner was 
not a party, that it had the power to limit the acreage of privately owned real estate to 100 acres, and 
then, in a second case, applied that principle to declare the complainant’s 101st acre to be public 
property, the State would have taken an acre from the complainant even though the decision was 
predictable.” 130 S. Ct. at 2610. It seems characteristic of the plurality’s mindset that this hypothetical 
describes a ruling that no court ever has, or dare I say would, contemplate. Here’s a more intriguing 
example: what if a state court followed the lead of the European Court of Human Rights and held that 
the transfer of ownership to an adverse possessor without compensation to the record owner violates the 
state constitutional takings provision? See J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (Nov. 15, 2005, 
application no. 44302/02). Such a ruling would eliminate an established common law right of an adverse 
possessor, even if it was intended to secure the rights of the record owner. 
 46. This view has been forthrightly advocated by Professor Richard Epstein, who views any 
reduction in the scope of property rights without compensation as illegitimate. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS (1985). 
 47. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, more precisely wrote that there were 
substantial problems with adopting a judicial takings doctrine, which counseled against adopting the 
plurality’s position. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2613. But he also recognized that the Due Process 
Clause applies to courts, and argued for a greater flexibility in addressing property rights claims, 
consistent with his views in other cases. Id. at 2614–17. 
 48. 130 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 49. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ( “Judicial 
self-restraint . . . will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual 
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie 
our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of 
powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.”). 
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would be liable only in damages for the plaintiff’s loss of land, and would not 
be enjoined to tear down the house.50 In doing so, the Washington court acted 
in accord with modern legal thinking in sanctioning as a remedy for trespass a 
“liability” rule rather than a “property” rule when such treatment would 
promote efficiency and fairness, even if it less-than-absolutely protects the 
plaintiff’s right to exclude. But, the plaintiff might plausibly argue that the 
court has eliminated his property right and effected a judicial taking within the 
terms of the plurality’s approach.51 
Consideration of Proctor reveals at least three major problems with the 
approach of the Stop the Beach plurality. First, the plurality does not clarify 
whether it is essential for a judicial taking that the established right be 
transferred to the state, as presented by the facts in the Stop the Beach, or 
whether any adjustment of entitlements among private litigants also may trigger 
a requirement for public compensation.52 The plurality seems at points to focus 
on Florida’s assertion of ownership of the reconstructed beach as crucial to a 
judicial taking, but at other points declares that judicial changes should be 
judged by the same constitutional criteria as legislative changes.53 Legislative 
changes, such as restrictions on land use, can be takings even though they 
transfer no rights of possession or use to the state, although they still must 
create public benefits to satisfy the Due Process Clause.54 If the judicial takings 
rule reaches common law changes that do not transfer property to the state, it 
would greatly extend the reach of the Court’s grasp of state property law.55 It 
 50. 238 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Wash. 2010). 
 51. Land use lawyer and author Robert H. Thomas argues on his blog that Proctor did effect a 
judicial taking. Robert H. Thomas, Why Isn’t This a “Judicial Taking?” Washington Supreme Court 
Orders Property Owner to Sell to Neighbor, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2010/08/why-isnt-this-a-judicial-taking-
washington-supreme-court-orders-property-owner-to-sell-to-neighbor.html. Even if a court concluded 
that the Proctor court had eliminated an established property right, there should be no constitutional 
violation because the court ordered the neighbor to compensate the injured land owner. One might state 
this as a general proposition that a court substituting a “liability” rule for a “property” rule, within the 
meaning of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), cannot be found to have 
effected a judicial taking without just compensation. 
 52. On this issue, see D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings 45 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 903 (2011). 
 53. The plurality relies largely on Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 
(1980), for the proposition that the state can neither by legislation nor by judicial decision declare 
property to be publicly rather than privately owned. 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02. But the plurality also states: 
“[T]he manner of state action may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a 
taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, 
depending on its nature and extent.” Id. at 2602. The plurality reads Webb’s more aggressively than is 
fair. Webb’s involved a legislative change, not a change in common law. Moreover, it did not create a 
per se rule: the court stressed, “No police power justification is offered for the deprivation. Neither the 
statute nor appellees suggest any reasonable basis to sustain the taking of the interest earned by the 
interpleader fund.” 449 U.S. at 163. 
 54. See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 55. See Timothy D. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247 
(2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/2/18/mulvaney.html. 
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also would threaten placing potentially massive liability on the state when its 
courts’ bring old rules in compliance with modern approaches to liability. 
Lucas56 had held that a federal court could review the state law basis for state 
court decisions upholding regulations against regulatory takings challenges 
because the regulations embodied state nuisance common law. The Stop the 
Beach plurality seems to claim the authority to review all changes in the state 
common law of property. Ominously, although Lucas explicitly recognized that 
nuisance law could change to adapt to new social conditions,57 the Stop the 
Beach plurality expressly rejected legal evolution that would encroach on 
private property rights.58 
Second, the plurality’s approach requires courts to decide what constitutes 
a property right for federal constitutional purposes. Regulatory takings law 
imposes baffling, metaphysical definitional questions upon property law that 
never arise within the practice of property law itself. Did the plaintiff in 
Proctor have a “property right” to an injunction requiring the defendant to 
remove his expensive structures from the plaintiff’s land, or is that merely a 
remedy for violation of the plaintiff’s right to exclude? In another case from 
Washington, is a landowner’s right to armor the shore against erosion a distinct 
property right or just a self-help remedy incidental to a right of possession?59 
What about a landowner’s traditional right to pump all the groundwater it 
wishes without regard to modern notions of reasonable use?60 The petitioners 
in Stop the Beach claimed both “the rights to accretions, and the right to have 
littoral property touch the water”; the U.S. Supreme Court never questioned 
whether such interests had the status of “rights,” only holding that they were 
not violated by avulsion.61 Yet, the Hawaii courts recently have held that a 
littoral owner’s interest in future accretions is merely an expectation, which the 
state may extinguish prospectively through legislation.62 We have no tradition 
to guide courts in distinguishing between property “rights” and the multitude of 
legal interests and remedies that make up the law of property. Placing property 
“rights” at the center of regulatory takings analysis requires scholastic 
distinctions between sticks and bundles and invites ideological manipulation 
behind a mystifying shield.63 Professor John Echeverria seems right that this 
 56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992). 
 57. Id. at 1030–31 (citing the balancing test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
 58. 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (“[J]udicial elimination of established private-property rights that is 
foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking”). 
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 60. See, e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). 
 61. 130 S. Ct. at 2610. Accretion refers to the gradual or imperceptible movement of a rivercourse 
or seaside waterline boundary, where the legal boundary line follows the waterline. Avulsion refers to 
sudden movement of a waterline, where the legal boundary does not move. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 
143 U.S. 359 (1892). 
 62. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, 222 P.3d 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 529 (2010). 
 63. The plurality itself also noted that it now would need to decide whether a right is established 
under state law. It straight-facedly commended itself for deference to state courts because it would not 
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abstract approach threatens a “breathtaking” general expansion of the 
regulatory takings doctrine beyond the fact-sensitive, fairness-based approach 
canonized in Penn Central.64 
Third, assuming that one can identify property “rights,” how would the 
U.S. Supreme Court determine whether a state supreme court has “eliminated” 
an “established” right? Whether property rights are established or eliminated 
are novel legal inquiries likely to be shaped by the ideological inclinations of 
the Supreme Court justices. In these cases, as in Stop the Beach, the state court 
will have denied that it has acted beyond its authority or changed the law. 
Common law judges have long interpreted their precedents to create space for 
adaptation to new circumstances.65 The Proctor court, for example, extensively 
reviewed conflicting precedents on when a plaintiff would be entitled to an 
injunction for an encroachment, grounding its approach in a long tradition of 
equitable weighing of the propriety of an injunction. It recognized “the 
evolution of property law in Washington away from rigid adherence to an 
injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible approach.”66 The court 
concluded: “Nothing in our holding today undermines fundamental property 
rights: it remains true that a landowner may generally obtain an injunction to 
eject trespassers.”67 Four justices dissented, however, feeling that the majority 
had overruled a key precedent, “dissolving [that decision’s] strong protection of 
private property rights.”68 
What justification could there be for the U.S. Supreme Court to reinterpret 
the state court’s own precedents after nine state justices chosen by that state’s 
political process have argued over the proper meaning of state law to determine 
both the contours of existing law and the permissible freedom of interpretation? 
Surely good-faith differences of legal interpretation by judges trained in their 
state’s common law and charged by their state constitutions with its 
preservation and adaptation do not give rise to federal constitutional objections. 
The Stop the Beach plurality may be concerned about bad faith, such as 
deceptive decisions that do not employ ordinary legal reasoning (“judicial 
decree”) that other state institutions cannot remedy. But such concerns sound in 
due process because judicial decisions of that nature depart from the rule of law 
and work an injustice regardless of the interests deprived. The Court has long 
make an independent determination about what the state rule is when there is doubt about its existence. 
Id. at 2608, n.9. 
 64. John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment  Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 475, 479-81 (2010). 
 65. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5 (1960) 
(“[T]he range for different kinds of action which is open to an appellate court while it ‘stands’ on ‘the 
things decided’ is a vast range, and that the most careful ‘standing’ is therefore not only over the long 
haul, but continuously, daily, a process of creative choice and of reshaping doctrine and result.”). 
 66. 238 P.3d at 1123. Recall that the Stop the Beach plurality expressly rejected slow evolution as 
a justification for legal change. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 67. Proctor, 238 P.3d at 1123. 
 68. Id. at 1129. 
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addressed bad-faith evasions of federal rights through Due Process Clause 
decisions69 and in occasional refusals to find limitation on federal jurisdiction 
from state court decisions lacking adequate and independent state grounds.70 
These approaches have necessarily been highly deferential to state court 
decisions, because they seek only to reach decisions about state law whose 
purpose is to evade federal rights. The Stop the Beach plaintiffs did not even 
raise a federal claim in the state courts. The plurality’s judicial takings rule 
conflates state property rules with federal constitutional rights. But the Takings 
Clause only prohibits states from taking property; it does not prohibit states 
from adapting their own property rules to new circumstances. 
The more aggressive judicial takings approach necessarily implies 
systemic distrust of state courts’ regard for private property. As it did in Stop 
the Beach itself, the U.S. Supreme Court, consisting of federal judges 
unschooled in state law, would review state law independently to assure itself 
that state precedents provide a foundation for the current decision. This 
disciplinary threat repeats the admonition in the Lucas case that the Supreme 
Court will review state court interpretations of state nuisance law in order to 
protect its aggressive regulatory takings limit on environmental legislation.71 
But if state courts cannot be trusted to deal responsibly with the tension 
between law and politics, neither can the U.S. Supreme Court. 
We have seen this before. In Bush v. Gore, the Court set aside the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of state election law ostensibly to secure an 
obscure Equal Protection right never otherwise invoked, while incidentally 
settling the 2000 presidential election in favor of the candidate of the party in 
which all five of the majority justices had been prominent members.72 
Dissenting in that case, Justice Stevens wrote: 
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida 
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and 
capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the 
vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without 
merit. The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can 
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges 
 69. See., e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944); Broad River 
Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (“[I]f there is no evasion of the constitutional 
issue, and the non-federal ground of decision has fair support, this Court will not inquire whether the 
rule applied by the state court is right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed the 
better rule, for that of the state court.”). 
 70. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (ruling by state court that 
federal constitutional challenge to contempt citation against civil rights group could not be heard 
because of procedural flaw did not defeat subsequent U.S. Supreme Court review of federal question 
because ruling conflicted with past “unambiguous holdings” of that court and thus lacked a fair and 
substantial basis in state law). 
 71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 72. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Bush v. 
Gore invoked Lucas as support for its authority to set aside state court interpretations of state law. 531 
U.S. at 115 n.1. 
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throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who administer 
the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. . . . 
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the 
winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is 
perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial 
guardian of the rule of law.73 
Such concerns apply to the Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings 
formulation as well. In arguing the need for it to oversee state court property 
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court necessarily denigrates the “impartiality and 
capacity” of state courts and undermines public respect for courts and law. 
But not just state courts. Whatever damage Bush v. Gore did to 
perceptions of state courts, it certainly seriously eroded the confidence of many 
close observers in the institutional “impartiality and capacity” of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which was seen to sacrifice an oft-proclaimed devotion to 
federalism in order to reverse a state law decision based upon a constitutional 
theory having no precedential support.74 Bush v. Gore at least had the virtue of 
resolving promptly what some feared could become a constitutional crisis.75 
There is no such excuse for Stop the Beach; indeed, the Supreme Court does 
not, and could not, argue that there is any deficit, let alone a crisis, in state court 
respect for private property. The U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion of a right to 
review state property decisions only makes sense if the Court’s decisions 
inspire greater confidence as more principled than those of state courts. But the 
truncated, almost cynical arguments of the plurality in Stop the Beach, like the 
partisan tilt of Bush v. Gore, undermine any such confidence.76 The erosion of 
respect for judicial decisionmaking has no logical stopping place.77 
 73. 531 U.S. at 128–29. 
 74. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Legal History, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1721, 1723 (2001) (“[I]t will be difficult to find neutral and detached lawyers who believe that 
Bush v. Gore was ‘grounded truly in principle’ or ‘in the language or design of the Constitution,’ rather 
than in the conservative Justices’ partisan preference for George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential 
election.”); Cass Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 759 (2001) (“From the 
standpoint of legal reasoning, the Court’s decision was very bad.”). Bush v. Gore is worse than Stop the 
Beach in that, as Michael Klarman stated, “It is one thing to say that a judge’s political ideology 
influences her constitutional interpretations. It is quite another to say that her partisan political 
preferences do.” 89 CALIF. L. REV. at 1725. The Stop the Beach opinion, however, does create a one-
way constitutional ratchet, attacking judicial decisions that weaken private property rights but not 
questioning decisions that expand private rights at the expense of the environment or other public 
interest. 
 75. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). 
 76. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts pursued a line of questions concerning political 
pressures on candidates for an elected judgeship to change a property rule. Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 35, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08–
1151). While such pressures raise concerns about judicial independence, the highly politicized, partisan 
maneuverings around U.S. Supreme Court appointments, as well as the predictable ideological tilt of 
some justices, preclude any naïve belief that members of the Court lack an ideological agenda. 
 77. See Echeverria, supra note 64 at 486 (“[T]here is no reason to conclude that judicial takings, if 
they can occur at all, could not be committed by federal courts.”). 
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The corrosive nature of the plurality’s judicial takings formulation is 
illustrated by a complaint recently filed in the Court of Federal Claims, Petro-
Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States.78 The plaintiff oil company argues that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit effected a judicial taking of its mineral 
interests in a National Forest.79 It claims that the court’s 2007 decision 
overturns a 1951 precedent dealing with nearly identical facts.80 In the most 
recent decision, the Fifth Circuit held that federal rather than state law applied, 
that under federal law the plaintiff’s interests were subject to prescription for 
non-use, and that they had been extinguished.81 The court explained that an 
intervening decision of the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that federal law 
must apply in the circumstances of the case.82 Plaintiffs claim in their 
complaint that the Fifth Circuit has “removed an ‘established right of private 
property.’”83 While there are numerous arguments against the plaintiff, their 
allegations are sufficiently colorable to show that judicial takings claims may 
be brought, under the Stop the Beach formulation, against Article III courts. 
Moreover, but for the barrier of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff might 
also have brought its judicial takings claim against the U.S. Supreme Court 
itself, whose 1973 decision necessitated the Fifth Circuit’s change of law.84 
Speculating about who would adjudicate such a claim against the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggests a reformulation of Justice Jackson’s famous aphorism: The 
Supreme Court is not final because it cannot take property; it cannot be held to 
take property because it is final.85 
 78. Restated Second Amended Complaint, Petro-Hunt, LLC v. United States, No. 00-512L (Fed. 
Cl. filed Sept. 16, 2010). I am grateful to Mr. James Gette, a lawyer with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
for informing me about this case. 
 79. Id at ¶¶ 5–9. 
 80. Id at ¶¶ 57–60. 
 81. The decision claimed to work a judicial taking is Petro-Hunt, LLC v. United States, 2007 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5233 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1242 (2008). That decision clarified an earlier 
decision in the same case, Petro-Hunt, LLC v. United States, 365 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2004). The earlier 
decision holding that the law of prescription did not apply to related interests is United States v. Nebo 
Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951). 
 82. 365 F.3d at 390–95, discussing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 
(1973). 
 83. Complaint, supra note 78, at ¶ 77, (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). 
 84. That the Supreme Court’s decisions about whether state or federal law applies to a property 
dispute can eliminate established property rights can be seen even in their treatment of riparian rights. 
Compare Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) (federal law governs ownership of riverbed 
exposed from migrating navigable river), with Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis, 429 U.S. 
363 (1977) (overruling Bonelli, state law applies). 
 85. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (“We are not final because we are infallible, we are 
infallible because we are final.”). 
      There are enormous problems with imagining how litigation to remedy judicial takings would 
progress other than through direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the plurality makes 
some suggestions, they seem contorted and dubious. In any event, however logical, it is hard to imagine 
a Federal Claims Court judge actually holding that the Supreme Court has effected a judicial taking. 
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One might argue that I protest too much against the Stop the Beach 
plurality opinion, given that it found no judicial taking on the facts of the 
case.86 It is true that the plurality, indeed all the Justices, upheld the judgment 
of the Florida Supreme Court that the fixing of the petitioners’ property 
boundaries did not deprive them of any established right under Florida law. But 
the Court’s reasoning pushes regulatory takings law in an alarming direction. 
The plurality holds that beach reconstruction constitutes “avulsion” under 
Florida common law, so that an upland owner’s boundary does not move with 
changes in the shoreline; if the shoreline had moved imperceptibly rather than 
visibly, the growth of the beach would have been classified as “accretion,” and 
the property line would have had to move with the high tide line. The U.S. 
Supreme Court did not find any distinction in Florida law between natural and 
state-constructed avulsions. Thus, the consequences of the statute duplicate the 
effects of the common law: the Florida court’s decision was found “consistent 
with . . . background principles of state property law.”87 States employing 
beach-rebuilding strategies, of course, welcome this because it provides a 
fortuitous doctrinal path to rebuild beaches and maintain public ownership.88 
But what solves a specific problem creates an undesirable reliance on common-
law concepts to frame the general approach to novel resource questions. 
Stop the Beach should never have been treated as problem of a judicial 
taking because it was the Florida Beach and Shore Protection Act that governed 
the scope of the littoral owners’ property. The Act has been in effect for fifty 
years and surely predates the acquisition of property by some or all of the 
petitioners. It always has provided that a beach rebuilt according to its 
procedures belongs to the public. This rule seems eminently fair because the 
public paid to save the beach, which protects the landowner from further 
erosion, and because the Act safeguards the other valuable legal rights of the 
upland owners. But the Florida court argued that the Act did not effect a taking 
because it was consistent with its common law, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
reviewed the state precedents to make sure that Florida did not change the 
common law in its interpretation. The justice and propriety of the Act’s 
allocation of rights should have been found constitutionally unexceptionable 
without regard to the common law. The emphasis on the common law as a 
 86. The Court may also develop such a narrow interpretation of elimination of an established 
property right that there are few or no cases to which it applies. This is what has happened to the Lucas 
per se rule that regulations that deprive an owner of all economic valuable use effects a taking. The 
Court later came to hold that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in 
which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002). Since regulation virtually never deprives land of all 
economic value, Lucas has been rendered toothless, at least until a future property-rights majority 
chooses to resurrect it. 
 87. 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at 1028–29). 
 88. The New Jersey Supreme Court quickly relied on Stop the Beach to hold that state beach 
replenishment gave ownership of the new beach to the state because it was an avulsion. Long Branch v. 
Liu, 4 A.3d 342 (N.J. 2010). 
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baseline in a regulatory takings case where a long-established statute governs 
the situation continues a worrisome trend of giving normative precedence to the 
common law.89 
Two problems with relying on avulsion in this case illustrate general 
problems with using the common law as a normative baseline for assessing the 
takings effect of a statute. First, the traditional common law rules of accretion 
and avulsion presuppose the unpredictability and randomness of the natural 
events causing sudden movements of sand and water. A principal argument for 
the justice of an accretion rule is that the respective owners sometimes will gain 
and sometimes will lose land with shifting waterlines.90 But the Court here 
applies the doctrine to an intricately planned, publicly financed public works 
project, undertaken with the knowledge that it would create property for the 
public. The legal effects of the construction were both foreseen and calculated 
by the very entity that would gain property from the project. Moreover, beach 
reconstruction projects will always move the waterline in the same direction. 
Second, the normative justification for the public’s ownership of the new 
beach has nothing to do with whether the shoreline moved quickly or slowly, 
resulting in an avulsion or accretion. Holding a modern statute to an ancient 
common law baseline precludes beneficial reform. Professor Sax has cogently 
argued that the accretion/avulsion distinction generally has lost the reasons for 
its existence and should be limited or abandoned (which could create more 
judicial takings).91 Courts following the distinction struggle to explain why it 
should matter.92 The distinction arose at a time when the recreational value of 
beaches was slight and the technology and social organization to replenish sand 
on an eroded beach did not exist. A common-law rule that would treat the 
boundary effects of deliberate public construction differently depending on 
whether it would be classified as accretion or avulsion would be entirely 
unmoored from any rationale in justice or policy. In this case, the Florida 
legislature made a considered, sensible, and fair judgment that such a project 
should create public ownership of the new beach, because the project enhances 
the public welfare at public expense with minor harm, if any, to the littoral 
 89. See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines  A Comment on Regulatory 
Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625 (2010). 
 90. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 69 (1874) (“The owner takes the chances of 
injury and of benefit arising from the situation of the property. If there be a gradual loss, he must bear it; 
if, a gradual gain, it is his.”). 
 91. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion / Avulsion Puzzle  Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010). Sax also points out how American courts, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court, have manipulated the distinction to reach results that seemed right. Id. at 343–49. 
 92. Thus in the recent case of Severance v. Patterson, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 854; 41 ELR 20016 (Tex. 
2010), the court repeatedly insisted that the distinction was crucial but could offer no coherent reason 
why. The court conceded that a public easement would “roll” onto former upland as the result of a storm 
or erosion if movement was slow and imperceptible but not if it were sudden. The court warned that 
recognizing the movement of the easement onto private land would be taking if the movement was 
found to be a avulsion because it would be a new easement, but there would be no taking if it was an 
accretion. The court recently scheduled the case for rehearing. 
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owner. But if the Stop the Beach plurality had found that the Florida court had 
made such a change in the common law while upholding the Act, it presumably 
would have declared a judicial taking. Under the plurality’s approach, it never 
would need to confront the reasonableness of the normative judgment about 
ownership inherent in the Florida statute. 
This leads to this Article’s final point: the kind of rigid per se regulatory 
takings rule favored by the Stop the Beach plurality should not apply to either 
legislative or judicial decisions. It should not matter at all whether the accretion 
rule for government beach reconstructions was “eliminated” by statute or 
judicial decision. Either branch can adapt law to new circumstances, although 
each branch presents certain advantages and dangers. Courts must change the 
common law so it remains useful and just for our society and economy. “It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down 
in the time of Henry IV.”93 The plurality’s approach leaves no room for 
consideration whether a judicial change in a common law rule that eliminates 
an established right replaces a stupid rule with one creating broad public 
benefits and imposing little or no harm on private owners. Thus, it inhibits 
welfare-enhancing changes in property law.94 
In his path-blazing article, Professor Thompson took existing regulatory 
takings law as a given and concluded that “there is no justification for 
exempting the judiciary from those property protections that are necessary 
where other branches of the government are concerned.”95 But the comparison 
can lead one to question Professor Thompson’s premise. Consideration of the 
flaws in the Stop the Beach plurality’s approach to judicial takings highlights 
serious problems in the regulatory takings doctrine as applied to legislation. 
Legislation provides the chief means of regulating property use in order to 
protect our common interests, such as in environmental protection, against the 
externalities of private decision making. Legislation enjoys several advantages 
over the common law, including prospectivity, flexibility, comprehensiveness, 
and democratic legitimacy.96 The Supreme Court has fashioned per se rules to 
find regulatory takings without weighing the public benefits of the challenged 
legislation. Our discomfort with applying such a machete to judicial decisions 
 93. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 94. In Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980), upon which the 
plurality relies for insisting that rule changes constitute takings, the Court carefully noted, “No police 
power justification is offered for the deprivation. Neither the statute nor appellees suggest any 
reasonable basis to sustain the taking of the interest earned by the interpleader fund.” I would argue that 
the Oregon Supreme Court’s still-controversial decision, State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 
(Or. 1969), using the obscure doctrine of custom to hold that the public cannot be excluded from the 
state’s beaches represents an entirely defensible adaption of beach ownership to account for the modern 
public interest in seashore recreation, the inability to cultivate or build on sand, and the limited interest 
of private owners in securing the purely economic advantages of exclusion. 
 95. Barton H. Thompson, Jr , Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1541 (1990). 
 96. See J. Peter Byrne, The Public Nature of Property Rights and the Property Nature of Public 
Law, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (Michael Diamond & Robin Malloy, eds., 
forthcoming 2011). 
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should sensitize us to the harms of applying it to legislation. If we cannot do 
without the regulatory takings idea in its entirety,97 then we should cabin it 
within fact-sensitive, multi-factor precincts of the Penn Central test. 
 
* * * 
 
There are several good sides to the plurality opinion in Stop the Beach. It 
did not secure a majority and was so insulting to Justice Kennedy that it likely 
never will.98 The reasoning is so thin that it embarrasses thoughtful lawyers 
sympathetic to some form of judicial takings. The rule it announces 
overreaches to such an extent that many will understand more clearly that the 
conservative bloc’s regulatory takings arguments amount to a naked power 
grab. 
More fundamentally, the opinion highlights deep and pervasive problems 
with the regulatory takings doctrine generally. It has no root in the language or 
history of the Takings Clause. It lacks a persuasive normative rationale. It 
extends a standing invitation to reactionary frustration of necessary 
environmental reform. The Stop the Beach plurality’s incompetent explanation 
for expanding the doctrine’s reach ironically provides a case study of why it 

















 97. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995). 
 98. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice  Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the 
Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006). 
 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org. 
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq. 
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